J. L. Speranza
2008-04-05 02:00:43 UTC
In #41520, M. Chase writes of what may dub 'krypto-tekhnicalities'. I agree
with what he says except for _13_ things. Nothing would be more boring than
two list-members of CLASSICS-L _agreeing_ on things (Grice finds inspiration in
Socrates's, Plato's, and Aristotle's account of "ta legomena" in three loci,
which make him describe Athens as "the other Oxford": Top., Eth. Nich., and
An. Post.
First, my teeth cringe at Chase's use of the word 'Oxbridge'. It's
Oxonian at most. People like Grice spent their lives segregating theirselves [sic]
from Cantabrigensis. It's not fair to unite them, although cfr. Alkebiades.
I said "The cat is on the mat". My point being that for Grice and Aristotle
(and Grice actually says, "For myself and _Socrates_", WoW, p. 238), it's _ta
legomena_, things said by people.
Second, I grant there are some minor differences between Aristotle and
Grice, so I think at this point it's best to compare Grice with 'barefoot'
Socrates. The typical Grice 'tutee' would be an upper-class Alkebiades.
Parallelly, Plato wrote the "Socrates Dialogues" to entertain upper-class youth.
There is a difference then between co-conversationalist. Plato (via Socrates)
and later, Aristotle, is mocking the 'man in the street'. Grice, with his
tutee, are mocking the British matron!
There are _two_ types of philosophical technicisms. (a) While I don't
expect Peters to include 'dog' in the dictionary, I do expect that he has
'aitia'. Now 'aitia' _has_ an 'ordinary-language' use (cfr. 'episteme', 'know').
So far as the philosopher is engaged in conceptual analysis of
ordinary-language words, I can't see he is guilty of introducing kryptotechnicalities.
After all, it's only 'clarity' he's looking forward to, and it has to do with
some 'youthful' movement (Austin felt he was leading the new generations of
philosophers into something of a 'revolution', and he was). (b) The other type
of philosophical technicism should be used 'with good measure', as we'd say.
Grice noted that Austin would introduce every now and then the occasional
technical term, "perlocutionary effect', say. Nothing _extraordinarily_
creative, neology-wise. Ditto for Grice 'implicature'. I submit that Aristotle's
'not-for-the-educated-citizen' technicism are of that harmless kind. These
_technicisms_ should justify their existence by what Grice called "ontological
Marxism": if they work, they exist. "Implicature" does work, therefore it exists.
It works in solving the old Socratic problems.
In _his_ Dict. of Philosophy_, Flew (who knew Grice so well and
quotes him under 'Meaning') cites the problem with "Eutyphro". It's not just
that Grice and Socrates are interested in the old Clintonian debate, "It
depends on what you mean by ...". Rather they are into _necessary_ and
_sufficient_ conditions for the legitimate use of "x". Is the holy one loved by the gods
because he is holy or is 'being-loved-by-the-gods' merely an implicature,
however conventionalised (but never an entailment) of what you say, man of the
street? Grice's published references to "ta legomena" are various:
(i) In "Reply to Richards": "When put to work, this conception of
ordinary language ["how clever language is"] offers fresh and manageable
approaches to philosophical problems, the appeal of which approach is in no way
diminished by the discernible affinity between them and the practice of
Aristotle in relation to _ta legomena_" (p. 57).
(ii) In "Preliminary valediction", Grice speaks of "To save the
phenomena is to save ta legomena. The phrase 'ta legomena' refers to the ways in
which ordinary people ordinarily talk. Thus Aristotle points out that,
unlike 'run' it is not legitimate to speak of 'being pleased quickly/slowly', from
which it can be entailed that hedone is not a process. My current favourite
here is due to Flew under 'intensive): "it is illegitimate to say that
Doruphoros is twice more kalos than Diadumenos". It's _thrice_. Ditto, Grice notes,
the platitude that people sometimes behave incontintently (akrasia) should
_not_ be threatened by an otherwise good analysis of 'boulesis' or the near
Greek stupid legomenon that philoi are worth-having "for their own sake" by a
good analysis of the Good Life is autarkhe. Grice, unlike Socrates, could
_feel_ the implicatures like *this*.
(Focus on 'ta legomena' has been revived recently by S. R.
Chapman's monograph on _Grice_ (45ff), although she fails to consider the different
approaches that Grice analyses regarding 'ta legomena' in some "Oxonian
quarters" (e.g. in Urmson's treatment of Paradigm Case Arguments), the main view
of the 'school' would be that 'no characterisation of the method carries with
it any claim about the truth-value of any of the specimens to which the
method applies).
As for Socrates/Grice 'analysis', "it is far from clear that ...
geometrical analysis, ... considering a problem as solved, and ... going back
through its concomitants to what is admitted, has very much at all to do
with what [Socrates or Grice are doing]." Agreed, but the fact that Socrates
never found _one_ analysis _successful may indicate that the premises were
_wrong_. For these people (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Grice, in short: the
Grecians/Griceans), "Nature" is "Reason" and "Reason" is "Nature": both are
_guided_ by that witty 'rule' of the 'game' of the 'reductio ad absurdum'
actually invented by Daddy Parmenides.
Further from Peters, "Greek Philosophical Lexicon". Amazing how
much we know already about philosophy just by looking at these terms, unlike the
other type of classical scholar who has to deal with words for 'pots' and
'pans', too! aitia akrasia aletheia ananke analogia antiphasis antonimia
apodeiktic arete arithmos axiologikos axioma boulesis bouleusis dedomenon
dialektika doxa dunamis eideia eidolon energeia empereia epagoge episteme ergomenon
ethos genetic hedonic homonumia katholikon katalepsis kosmogonia kosmologia
mathesis mesotes mnemonic monas morphe nous oikeiosis parabola paronimia pathos
phantasia philautia philokalia philosophia-prote phronesis poiesis poiotes
politic poiologikos posologikos praxis prolegomena psukhologia pseudos pragma
problema skhema skhole sorites sumbebekos summetria sunonimia tekhne thema
theorema thesis tropos.
Chase comments: "We have [with Aristotle] the origin of jargon. ... [His]
introduction of jargon leads to ... the ordinary [Alkebiades] ha[ving] no hope
of being able to pick up and read a philosophical [papyr], much less apply
it to his/her life. What is ... required is a priestly caste of [bare-foot
hobos], the ... repositories of Knowledge, ... the necessary intermediaries
between [Wisdom] and [the philosophy] readers: only though the[ir] intercession
... can readers understand [what they are talking about]. This [reaches] its
perfection in [Oxford] Analytical philosophy, [where] philosophy has become of
[transitory] interest only to [the elitist few of Grice's 'Alkebiades'
tuttees] and those few enlightened [ones] who have the leisure and the wherewithal
to pursue it .... JLS presumably views ... this ... positive[ly]"
Presumably, yes,
while at the Swimming Pool Library.
JL
**************Planning your summer road trip? Check out AOL Travel Guides.
(http://travel.aol.com/travel-guide/united-states?ncid=aoltrv00030000000016)
with what he says except for _13_ things. Nothing would be more boring than
two list-members of CLASSICS-L _agreeing_ on things (Grice finds inspiration in
Socrates's, Plato's, and Aristotle's account of "ta legomena" in three loci,
which make him describe Athens as "the other Oxford": Top., Eth. Nich., and
An. Post.
First, my teeth cringe at Chase's use of the word 'Oxbridge'. It's
Oxonian at most. People like Grice spent their lives segregating theirselves [sic]
from Cantabrigensis. It's not fair to unite them, although cfr. Alkebiades.
I said "The cat is on the mat". My point being that for Grice and Aristotle
(and Grice actually says, "For myself and _Socrates_", WoW, p. 238), it's _ta
legomena_, things said by people.
Second, I grant there are some minor differences between Aristotle and
Grice, so I think at this point it's best to compare Grice with 'barefoot'
Socrates. The typical Grice 'tutee' would be an upper-class Alkebiades.
Parallelly, Plato wrote the "Socrates Dialogues" to entertain upper-class youth.
There is a difference then between co-conversationalist. Plato (via Socrates)
and later, Aristotle, is mocking the 'man in the street'. Grice, with his
tutee, are mocking the British matron!
There are _two_ types of philosophical technicisms. (a) While I don't
expect Peters to include 'dog' in the dictionary, I do expect that he has
'aitia'. Now 'aitia' _has_ an 'ordinary-language' use (cfr. 'episteme', 'know').
So far as the philosopher is engaged in conceptual analysis of
ordinary-language words, I can't see he is guilty of introducing kryptotechnicalities.
After all, it's only 'clarity' he's looking forward to, and it has to do with
some 'youthful' movement (Austin felt he was leading the new generations of
philosophers into something of a 'revolution', and he was). (b) The other type
of philosophical technicism should be used 'with good measure', as we'd say.
Grice noted that Austin would introduce every now and then the occasional
technical term, "perlocutionary effect', say. Nothing _extraordinarily_
creative, neology-wise. Ditto for Grice 'implicature'. I submit that Aristotle's
'not-for-the-educated-citizen' technicism are of that harmless kind. These
_technicisms_ should justify their existence by what Grice called "ontological
Marxism": if they work, they exist. "Implicature" does work, therefore it exists.
It works in solving the old Socratic problems.
In _his_ Dict. of Philosophy_, Flew (who knew Grice so well and
quotes him under 'Meaning') cites the problem with "Eutyphro". It's not just
that Grice and Socrates are interested in the old Clintonian debate, "It
depends on what you mean by ...". Rather they are into _necessary_ and
_sufficient_ conditions for the legitimate use of "x". Is the holy one loved by the gods
because he is holy or is 'being-loved-by-the-gods' merely an implicature,
however conventionalised (but never an entailment) of what you say, man of the
street? Grice's published references to "ta legomena" are various:
(i) In "Reply to Richards": "When put to work, this conception of
ordinary language ["how clever language is"] offers fresh and manageable
approaches to philosophical problems, the appeal of which approach is in no way
diminished by the discernible affinity between them and the practice of
Aristotle in relation to _ta legomena_" (p. 57).
(ii) In "Preliminary valediction", Grice speaks of "To save the
phenomena is to save ta legomena. The phrase 'ta legomena' refers to the ways in
which ordinary people ordinarily talk. Thus Aristotle points out that,
unlike 'run' it is not legitimate to speak of 'being pleased quickly/slowly', from
which it can be entailed that hedone is not a process. My current favourite
here is due to Flew under 'intensive): "it is illegitimate to say that
Doruphoros is twice more kalos than Diadumenos". It's _thrice_. Ditto, Grice notes,
the platitude that people sometimes behave incontintently (akrasia) should
_not_ be threatened by an otherwise good analysis of 'boulesis' or the near
Greek stupid legomenon that philoi are worth-having "for their own sake" by a
good analysis of the Good Life is autarkhe. Grice, unlike Socrates, could
_feel_ the implicatures like *this*.
(Focus on 'ta legomena' has been revived recently by S. R.
Chapman's monograph on _Grice_ (45ff), although she fails to consider the different
approaches that Grice analyses regarding 'ta legomena' in some "Oxonian
quarters" (e.g. in Urmson's treatment of Paradigm Case Arguments), the main view
of the 'school' would be that 'no characterisation of the method carries with
it any claim about the truth-value of any of the specimens to which the
method applies).
As for Socrates/Grice 'analysis', "it is far from clear that ...
geometrical analysis, ... considering a problem as solved, and ... going back
through its concomitants to what is admitted, has very much at all to do
with what [Socrates or Grice are doing]." Agreed, but the fact that Socrates
never found _one_ analysis _successful may indicate that the premises were
_wrong_. For these people (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Grice, in short: the
Grecians/Griceans), "Nature" is "Reason" and "Reason" is "Nature": both are
_guided_ by that witty 'rule' of the 'game' of the 'reductio ad absurdum'
actually invented by Daddy Parmenides.
Further from Peters, "Greek Philosophical Lexicon". Amazing how
much we know already about philosophy just by looking at these terms, unlike the
other type of classical scholar who has to deal with words for 'pots' and
'pans', too! aitia akrasia aletheia ananke analogia antiphasis antonimia
apodeiktic arete arithmos axiologikos axioma boulesis bouleusis dedomenon
dialektika doxa dunamis eideia eidolon energeia empereia epagoge episteme ergomenon
ethos genetic hedonic homonumia katholikon katalepsis kosmogonia kosmologia
mathesis mesotes mnemonic monas morphe nous oikeiosis parabola paronimia pathos
phantasia philautia philokalia philosophia-prote phronesis poiesis poiotes
politic poiologikos posologikos praxis prolegomena psukhologia pseudos pragma
problema skhema skhole sorites sumbebekos summetria sunonimia tekhne thema
theorema thesis tropos.
Chase comments: "We have [with Aristotle] the origin of jargon. ... [His]
introduction of jargon leads to ... the ordinary [Alkebiades] ha[ving] no hope
of being able to pick up and read a philosophical [papyr], much less apply
it to his/her life. What is ... required is a priestly caste of [bare-foot
hobos], the ... repositories of Knowledge, ... the necessary intermediaries
between [Wisdom] and [the philosophy] readers: only though the[ir] intercession
... can readers understand [what they are talking about]. This [reaches] its
perfection in [Oxford] Analytical philosophy, [where] philosophy has become of
[transitory] interest only to [the elitist few of Grice's 'Alkebiades'
tuttees] and those few enlightened [ones] who have the leisure and the wherewithal
to pursue it .... JLS presumably views ... this ... positive[ly]"
Presumably, yes,
while at the Swimming Pool Library.
JL
**************Planning your summer road trip? Check out AOL Travel Guides.
(http://travel.aol.com/travel-guide/united-states?ncid=aoltrv00030000000016)